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INTRODUCTION
In Weitz v. Green, this Court issued an admonition against the use of self-help to solve
boundary line issues:
This Court strongly disfavors the resort to forceful self-help in resolving
property disputes. When parties have entered into a conflict over real
property the rights are usually fixed far in advance of the exchange of
attorneys' letters, or subsequent filing of a lawsuit, motions, depositions,
and hearings. Making a bold physical attempt to gain, or regain,
possession or control of a real property interest, by demolishing or
erecting gates or fences, bulldozing land, etc., results in no strategic
advantage. Instead, passions become inflamed, positions become
entrenched, damages are exacerbated rather than mitigated, and the
parties end up spending far more money in litigation than their
supposed interest was worth to begin with. Attorneys who counsel their
clients to engage in self-help, without being certain that the respective
rights and responsibilities have been settled, do their clients a disservice.
Clients who ignore the advice of counsel and take matters into their own
hands do themselves a disservice. In short, parties who attempt to solve
a property dispute through their own forceful action do so at their
own peril.

Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 864, 230 P.3d 743, 756 (2010) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added). Despite this clear warning, Appellants James F. Croston and Margorie C.
Croston ("Crostons") engaged in self-help by forcibly claiming for themselves almost 1,900
square feet of property belonging to Respondents William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer,
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Fischers"). The Crostons did so by
unilaterally constructing a fence on property that they claimed belonged to them, but in actuality
belonged to the Fischers. When it became clear that the parties were in a dispute over their
mutual boundary line between the properties, the Crostons should have ceased their fence
building and engaged in discussions with their neighbors. Unfortunately, the Crostons chose not
to do this, but instead opted for a "bold physical attempt to gain possession or control" of a
portion of the Fischers' property, by constructing a new fence.
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The Crostons' actions compelled the Fischers to file a civil suit to reclaim their lost
property based on well-established case law which conclusively demonstrated that the property
belonged to the Fischers. At the District Court, the Fischers moved for summary judgment based
on this established law-the doctrine of boundary by agreement. _In opposition, the Crostons
alleged that in 2015, the parties entered into an oral agreement wherein the Fischers supposedly
agreed to allow the Crostons to take their property and substantially interfere with their
established access road to the west end of the property. However, both in discovery and at
summary judgment, the Crostons failed to produce any competent evidence that an oral
agreement between the parties existed. Accordingly, the District Court properly granted the
Fischers summary judgment in their favor.
The Crostons have since appealed the District Court's ruling, but failed to explicitly
assign any error to the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order ("Decision").
Moreover, the Crostons failed to provide substantial legal arguments justifying their appeal.
Instead, the Crostons have "simply asked this Court to second guess the district court" without
providing any foundation in light of long-standing law on the issues. Teton Peaks Investment
Co. v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 397, 195 P.3d 1207, 1210 (2008). Because of this fact, this Court

should affirm the District Court's Decision and award the Fischers their reasonable attorney's
fees and costs against the Crostons pursuant to Idaho Code ("LC.")§ 12-121.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Fischers own real property in Bonneville County, Idaho, located at 3000 S. Western
Avenue, Ammon, Idaho ("Fischer Property"), which is legally described as:
Lot 3, and the South 59 feet of Lot 2, Block 12, Ammon Townsite,
Bonneville County, State of Idaho, according to the recorded plat
thereof.
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R. Vol. I., ("R.") at 8. The Fischers acquired the Fischer Property in their individual capacity in
1992 and later transferred it into a trust on November 2, 2001. R. at 8. The Fischers are trustees
of this trust. R. at 8.
The Fischers originally purchased the Fischer Property from Douglas M. Ackerman and
Cheryl A. Ackerman in January 1992. R. at 103. The Ackermans obtained the Fischer Property
from Larry J. Kennedy and Sharon Kennedy less than a year earlier, in June 1991. R. at 102.
The Kennedys acquired the Fischer Property in 1982 from Sharon Kennedy's parents, Levi D.
Barzee and Inza E. Barzee, who had owned the property since 1943. R. at 101.
Immediately adjacent to the south of the Fischer property is real property owned by the
Crostons, commonly known as 3020 S. Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho ("Croston Property").

R. at 8. The Croston Property is legally described as:
Lot number four (4), Block number twelve (12) of the Ammon
Townsite, Bonneville County, State of Idaho as per recorded plat
thereof.

R. at 8. The northern boundary of the Croston Property is the southern boundary of the Fischer
Property. R. at 8. The Crostons acquired the Croston Property in March 1959, from Denzel W.
Rowbury and Viola H. Rowbury. R. at 110. At the time the Crostons purchased the Croston
Property, there was an existing post-and-wire fence running along the Fischer Property's
southern boundary, dividing the Fischer Property and Croston Property ("Old Fence"). R. at 8182, 119.

The Fischers do not know when the Old Fence was first constructed.

R. at 68.

However the Old Fence predated the Crostons' acquisition of the Croston Property such that the
date and purpose for construction of the Old Fence is beyond the personal knowledge of the
Crostons. R. at 113, 114, 119. The best evidence currently available reflects that the Old Fence
existed since at least 1951. R. at 81.
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Specifically, the declarations of Sharon Anderson and

Larry Kennedy set forth their familiarity of the Old Fence, its location since at least 1951, and
the common understanding.that the Old Fence represented the southern boundary of the Fischer
Property. See R. at 80 -94.
In addition to the Old Fence, there was a shed on a concrete foundation located on the
south-west side of the Fischer Property ("Shed"). R. at 85-86. It is unknown when this Shed
was built or who built it. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the prior owners of the Fischer
Property primarily used the Shed to store tools and animal feed. R. at 85-86. To access the
Shed, there runs an existing, two-track dirt road that ran west from Western Avenue along the
southern boundary of the Fischer Property until it met up with the Shed (the ..Access Road"). R.
at 8.
In 1992, the Fischers built a single-family home on the Fischer Property. R. at 68.
When they purchased the Fischer Property, the Fischers regarded and understood the Old Fence
to be the southern boundary of their property. R. at 8. Furthermore, from 1992 to 1996, the
Fischers used the entire length and breadth of the Access Road to access the western part of the
Fischer Property and the Shed. R. at 8-9.
In or about 1996, the Fischers constructed a large garage ("Garage") approximately 140
feet to the west of the easternmost boundary, and approximately 15 feet north of the Old Fence.

R. at 9. Around the same time; the Fischers removed the Shed in order to utilize the space it
occupied, but left the Shed's concrete foundation intact. R. at 9. The Fischers continued to use
the Access Road in order to access the Garage and used the space between the Garage and the
Old Fence to access the westernmost part of the Fischer Property. R. at 9. Altogether, The
Fischers exclusively used the Access Road to access the western portion of the Fischer Property
and the Garage for over 24 years. R. at 9.
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Since purchasing and building a home on the Fischer Property, the Fischers have
regarded and treated the Old Fence as their southern boundary line. R. at 8. The Fischers
maintained the Fischer Property up to the Old Fence for over two decades by mowing and
controlling the large grasses that grow on the property, especially along the Old Fence. R. at 69.
Until 2015, the Fischers never witnessed the Crostons, or anyone else, maintaining the
Old Fence. R. at 9. As a result, the Old Fence decayed to a point that certain portions had failed
and fallen onto the Fischer Property. R. at 9. Due to the dilapidated condition of the Old Fence,
the Fischers decided to replace it with a new, more aesthetically pleasing fence in August 2015.

R. at 9.
While the Fischers were in the midst of replacing the Old Fence, the Crostons sent them a
letter dated September 4, 2015, wherein they threatened to sue the Fischers for trespass and
malicious injury to the Croston Property ("Demand Letter") for their work on the Old Fence. R.
at 9, 125. This Demand Letter also required that the Fischers "restore [the] property to [the
Crostons'] satisfaction." R. at 125. At the bottom of the Demand Letter, it appeared that the
Crostons sent additional copies of the letter to the City of Ammon's Planning Department and
Code Enforcement Department, the Bonneville County Sheriff, and the Progressive Irrigation
District. R. at 125. Given the tone and tenor of the Demand Letter and the inclusion of third
party governmental agencies, the Fischers immediately ceased replacing the Old Fence and
consulted with their attorney regarding what they could do to avoid being sued. R. at 9, 69·.
When the Fischers ceased their work on the Old Fence, portions of it still remained as evidence
by pictures taken by both the Crostons and the Fischers. R. at 79, 158, and 159. 1

1 The Crostons have argued that the Old Fence was completely removed at the time that the started constructing the
New Fence. This is a false statement which is contradicted by photographic evidence in the record. See R. at 79,
158, and 159.
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Wanting to avoid litigation with the Crostons, the Fischers commissioned Ellsworth &
Associates, PLLC, ("Ellsworth") to conduct a survey of the existing boundary line between the
Fischer Property and Croston Property. R. at 10. The Fischers wanted a survey to ensure that
the replacement fence would be located exactly where the Old Fence had been, because the
Fischers had removed parts of the Old Fence. R. at 69.
Prior to the survey, Respondent Ann Fischer ("Mrs. Fischer") encountered and spoke
with Jim Croston ("Jim"), on or about August 30, 2015.

R. at 70.

At the time of their

conversation, Mrs. Fischer did not know that Jim was the son of the Crostons. R. at 70. Jim was
in the process of marking and measuring those portions where the Old Fence had been, using
spray paint to draw a line approximating the Old Fence's location on those portions where it had
been removed. R. at 70. During their conversation, Mrs. Fischer indicated to Jim that the
Fischers would be replacing the Old Fence with a better one. R. at 70. Mrs. Fischer informed
Jim that the Fischers had hired a survey company to mark the line of the Old Fence so there
would be no disputes when they constructed the new fence. R. at 70, 127. Mrs. Fischer denies
that she ever entered into an oral agreement changing the properties' boundary during any
portion of her conversation with Jim. R. at 70. Rather, Mrs. Fischer merely informed Jim of the
steps the Fischers were planning on taking to replace the fence on the boundary between the
properties. R. at 70. At the time of this conversation, there was no reason to believe that the Old
Fence was not on the deeded boundary line. R. at 70.
In September 2015, Ellsworth surveyed the boundary line between the Fischer and
Croston properties, placing survey markers. R. at 10. During this survey, the surveyor made
several marks on the Fischer property to correspond with Ellsworth's understanding of the
location of the lot boundaries according to the recorded plat of the Ammon Townsite ("Plat"). R.
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at 10. Upon visual review of the survey markers, it appeared that the location of the Old Fence
did not follow the lot line shown on the Plat. R. at 10. Instead, the easternmost post of the Old
Fence appeared to be approximately two and a half feet south of the north lot line, with the Old
Fence running in a straight line to a westernmost point approximately 8 feet south of the lot line
of the Croston Property shown on the Plat. R. at 10.
The area located between the Old Fence and the platted boundary, as shown by the
Ellsworth survey, consists of 1,896 square feet and is legally described as follows:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, Block 12, of the Original
Ammon Townsite, Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N.
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest comer of said Lot 4; then S.
00°00'21 "W. along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an
existing fence line; thence S. 89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21"
E. along said East line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING

R. at 10, 128 (hereinafter referred to as "Tract 1").
After reviewing the survey and identifying Tract 1, the Fischers overnighted a letter to
the Crostons dated September 24, 2015, notifying them of the fence line discrepancy, asserting
the Fischers' legal right to Tract 1, and offering settlement of any potential issues between the
Parties. R. at 11. At the same time, the Fischers posted two "No Trespassing" signs along the
Old Fence. R. at 11.
On or about September 25, 2015, counsel for the Fischers called the Crostons and spoke
with Appellant Marjorie Croston ("Marjorie"). R. at 131. According to Marjorie, the Fischers
attorney notified her of the Fischers' legal claim to Tract I, instructed her not to construct a new
fence until the parties came to an agreement, and told her to expect a letter in the mail outlining
the Fischers' claims. R. at 131. Marjorie informed the Fischers' attorney that her daughter,
Linda Penning ("Penning"), had the Crostons' Power of Attorney to act on their behalf in this
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matter. R. at 131. Following this phone call, Marjorie called Penning and informed her of her
conversation with the Fischers' attorney.

R. at 132. Contrary to the Fischers' reasonable

requests, Penning told Marjorie that she "would put the fence up now instead of waiting" as they
wanted "to run some livestock anyway." R. at 132. However, the Crostons could not put
livestock on the Croston Property due to prohibitions within the Ammon City Code. R. at 133 137.
On September 27, 2015, Penning began construction of a new wire fence along what she
assumed to be the boundary line ("New Fence"). R. at 11. Upon seeing the fencing crews on
their property, the Fischers provided Penning with a copy of their letter dated September 24,
2015, and requested that she cease building the fence. R. at 11. When Penning refused to
comply with the Fischers' request, the Fischers' attorney immediately called Marjorie Croston.
R. at 138. When Marjorie did not answer the phone, the Fischers' attorney left her a detailed

voice message wherein he strongly advised that she instruct Penning to stop constructing the
New Fence lest the Fischers file a lawsuit against her. R. at 138. Unfortunately, despite the
Fischers' numerous demands, the Crostons proceeded to complete the New Fence by the end of
the day. R. at 1 1.
Currently, the New Fence blocks the Fischers' access to the western portion of their
property over the Access Road running next to the Garage. R. at 69. The New Fence runs at
such an angle that it encroaches almost 9 feet into the Fischers' Property at the western end of
the property, crossing the old concrete foundation of the Shed. R. at 128, 139-142.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Should the Court deny the Crostons' appeal in toto where Appellants' Opening Brief fails
to properly designate issues on appeal?
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2. Did the Crostons waive their right to challenge the District Court's decision to strike
portions of the Affidavit of Linda D. Penning by failing to designate it as an issue on
appeal and also failing to provide any argument or authority to challenge the Decision?
3. Are the Fischers entitled to attorney fees where the Crostons' appeal was brought,
pursued, and defended frivolously and where the Crostons' appeal merely disputes the
District Court's factual findings as opposed to providing detailed legal analysis and
argumentation?
ARGUMENT
A. Because Appellants' Brief Fails to Designate Issues on Appeal, the Crostons' Appeal
Should Be Denied in Toto.

Rule 35(a)(4) of the Idaho Appellate Rules expressly requires that appellant's brief
contain "[a] list of the issues present on appeal, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the
case but without unnecessary detail." This Court has repeatedly warned that failure to designate
issues on appeal in accordance with I.AR. 35(a)(4) is "cause for denying an appeal" due to the
fact that "[i]t is not the duty of this Court to review the record for errors."

Everhart v.

Washington Cty. Rd & Bridge Dep't, 130 Idaho 273, 274, 939 P.2d 849, 850 (1997) (citation

omitted); see also Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 525, 272 P.3d
491, 497 (2012) ("appellant's failure to include in his initial appellate brief a fair statement of an
issue presented for review results in waiver of the issue."); State v. Hoisington, 104 Idaho 15 3,
159, 657 P.2d 17, 23 (1983) ("This Court has consistently followed the rule that it will not
review the actions of a district court which have not been specifically assigned as error[,]
[e]specially where there are no authorities cited nor argument contained in the briefs upon the
question.").
Despite the foregoing, this Court has also held that the requirements of I.A.R. 35(a)(4)
may be relaxed if the briefing addressed an issue through authority or argument. Everhart, 130
Idaho at 274, 939 P.2d at 850; Weisel, 152 Idaho at 525, 272 P.3d at 297. However, for the
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Court to relax this rule, appellant's opening brief must "contain the contentions of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the
authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." Weisel, 152 Idaho at 525,
272 P.3d at 297 (citation omitted). Conversely, "if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not
supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court." Bach v.
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citation omitted). Altogether, this

Court has "repeatedly stated that [it] will not consider an issue not supported by argument and
authority in the opening brief." Weisel, 152 Idaho at 525,272 P.3d at 297.
Here, Appellants' Brief does not expressly designate any issues on appeal or otherwise
clearly articulate any fault on part of the District Court below. See generally Appellants' Brief.
Rather1 Appellants' Brief confusingly designates an "additional issue on appeal," following

I.AR. 34(b)(4), as though the Crostons were respondents. Id at, pp. 3, 9. Even then, this
"additional issue" fails to address the District Court's award of attorney's fees by arguing the
wrong statute. R. at 14-16 cf. R. 293. Accordingly, the analysis then switches to whether the
Crostons properly and adequately briefed issues within their argument, enabling the Court to
relax the requirements of I.AR. 35(a)(4). However, Appellants' Brief fails on this account as
well.
Turning to the substance of the Crostons' arguments, it is hard to find where in
Appellants' Brief that the Crostons expressly find fault with the District Court's Decision. While
there are about three specific sentences where the Crostons generally assert the District Court
was wrong in its reasoning on a particular fact,2 there is precious little argument or legal analysis
supporting the Crostons' overall claims. Instead, the Crostons' appeal "simply disputes the trial
court's factual findings" without providing anything more.
2

See Appellants' Brief, at pp. 11 - 12.
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Flying Elk Investment, LLC v.

Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 16, 232 P.3d 330, 337 (2010). Failing to provide legal argumentation
supported by relevant authority is fatal to the Crostons' appeal. Specifically, this Court has
warned that "[a} general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, without
specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue." Minor

Miracle Prods., LLC v. Starkey, 152 Idaho 333, 337, 271 P.3d 1189, 1193 (2012). (citation
omitted).

Moreover, the "Court will not search the record on appeal for error" where the

appellant fails to adequately assign error to the district court's decision. Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, the Crostons' appeal fails as a whole, lacking support from the record.
Ultimately, it is not the Court's burden to parse out the Crostons' legal arguments or
decipher which of the District Court's findings and conclusions that the Crostons believe are
flawed. Therefore, the Court should deny the Crostons' appeal outright for failure to properly
designate issues on appeal and/or failure to provide sufficient supporting argumentation with
citations to relevant authorities.

B. The Crostons Are Precluded from Relying on Portions of the Affidavit of Linda D.
Penning Because They Failed to Challenge the District Court's Decision Striking
These Portions Based on Lack of Foundation and Hearsay.
On appeal, "[t]he failure to support on alleged error with argument and authority is
deemed a waiver of the issue." Matter of Estate of Logan, 120 Idaho 226,231,815 P.2d 35, 40
(Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Haight v. Dale's Used Cars, Inc., 139 Idaho 853,
885, 87 P.3d 926,964 fu.l (Ct. App. 2003). Additionally, failure to designate issues on appeal in
accordance with I.A.R. 35(a)(4) is "cause for denying an appeal" as discussed supra in Section
A.
In the District Court, the Fischers moved to strike the Affidavit of Linda D. Penning
("Penning Affidavit") entirely on the basis that it was unsigned and not properly notarized as
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required for affidavits under I.C. § 51-109. R. at 207 - 210. In the alternative, the Fischers
moved to strike all of the exhibits appended to the Penning Affidavit on the basis that they
lacked proper foundation, contained inadmissible hearsay, and violated I.R.C.P. 37(c)(l). R. 210
- 212. Ruling on the Fischer's motion to strike, the District Court struck exhibits A, B, and D to
the Penning Affidavit on the basis of hearsay and lack of foundation. R. at 246 - 247. However,
the District Court denied the remainder of the Fischers' motion to strike for unstated reasons. See
R. at 247.

Here, Appellants' Brief neither challenges nor addresses the District Court's decision to
strike certain exhibits from the Penning Affidavit.

See generally, Appellants' Brief.

Accordingly, the Crostons waived their right to challenge this ruling. See Matter of Estate of

Logan, 120 Idaho at 231, 815 P.2d at 40. The Crostons' waiver of this issue is important because
it limits the evidence in the record that this Court is able to review. Moreover, it renders all
citations to the stricken exhibits within Appellants' Brief as improper. For example, on page 10
of Appellants' Brief, the Crostons cite to Exhibit D to the Penning Affidavit as evidence.
However, as discussed above, the District Court struck Exhibit D. R. at 246 -247. Accordingly,
the Court should disregard this citation and all other citations referencing or incorporating
exhibits A, B, and D to the Penning Affidavit as evidence.

C. The District Court Properly Found That the Old Fence Is the True Boundary Line
Between the Fischer Property and Croston Property under the Doctrine of
Boundary Line by Agreement.
The District Court properly found that the Old Fence marked and served as the boundary
between the Fischer Property and Croston Property for over six decades ·before this dispute
arose. R. at 248. Fences that have been in place for a long time are presumed to be the true
boundary under Idaho Law. See Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264,271, 127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005).
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Furthermore, the conduct of prior property owners demonstrate that the Old Fence was regarded
as the true boundary between the properties. These facts, coupled with lack of any evidence
from those who were alive at the time the fence was built, create the presumption that the Old
Fence is the true boundary between the properties. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Fischers which declared that the Old
Fence is the true boundary between the Fischer Property and Croston Property.
The doctrine of boundary by agreement3 is well established in Idaho law. The doctrine is
based upon the premise that long acquiescence between neighbors concerning the boundary line
between their properties ought to preclude "a controversy that will involve rights that have been
unquestioned for a generation." Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho 715, 718, 819 P.2d 569, 572 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citation omitted). "Where the boundary is uncertain or disputed, coterminous
owners 'may orally agree upon a boundary line' and such an agreement can become binding on
successors if the parties to the oral agreement take possession under it." Flying Elk Inv., 149
Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334 (citing Downing v. Boehringer, 82 Idaho 52, 56,349 P.2d 306, 308
(1960)).
As distilled by this Court, "[b]oundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements:
(I) there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the

boundary." Luce, 142 Idaho at 271, 127 P.3d at 174. Concerning the first element, "[t]here is no
requirement that there be a dispute over the boundary. Rather, there must be either uncertainty or
a dispute as to the location of the true boundary." Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 521, 523, 960
P.2d 742, 744 (1998). Moreover, "if the location of the true boundary is unknown to either of
the parties, and is uncertain or in dispute, such coterminous owners may agree upon a boundary
"Though [Idaho] cases often use the phrase 'boundary by acquiescence' interchangeably with 'boundary by
agreement,' ... the latter phrase more accurately describes the doctrine." Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 40, 794
P.2d 626,629 (1990).
3
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line." Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527,531,633 P.2d 592,596 (1981). Finally, "[i]gnorance of
the true boundary creates the uncertainty necessary to satisfy the first element." Flying Elk Inv.,
149 Idaho at 13,232 P.3d at 334 (citing Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870,873, (1993)).
Concerning the second element, "[t]he agreement may be either express or implied by the
landowners' conduct." Flying Elk Inv., 149 Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334 (citing Teton Peaks

Investment Co. v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394,397, 195 P.3d 1207, 1210 (2008)). Since there must be
an agreement, acquiescence "is merely regarded as competent evidence of the agreement," and
alone is not enough to establish a boundary by agreement. Flying Elk Inv., 149 Idaho at 13,232
P.3d at 334 (citation omitted). However, "[a]llowing an adjoining landowner to improve the
disputed land is evidence of an agreement." Id (citation omitted).
If the elements of boundary by agreement are satisfied, "the parties to the agreement are
no longer entitled to the amount of property provided for in their deeds and must absorb the
effect of any increase or decrease in the amount of their property as a result of the new
boundary." Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245, 247 (2001).

"The new

boundary then is binding on successors in interest who purchase with notice of the agreement."

Anderson v. Rex Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741, 744, 185 P.3d 253, 256 (2008) (citation
omitted).
In evaluating the existence of an implied agreement regarding a boundary line fence,
Idaho courts are guided by two related presumptions:
First, when a fence line has been erected, and then coterminous
landowners have treated that fence line as fixing the boundary
· between their properties for such a length of time that neither
ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location the law
presumes an agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary
Second, coupled with the long existence and recognition of a fence
as a boundary, the want of any evidence as to the manner or
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circumstances of its original location, the law presumes that it
was originally located as a boundary by agreement because of
uncertainty or dispute as to the true line.
Luce, 142 Idaho at 271-72, 127 P.3d at 174 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis and

internal spacing added). Based on these presumptions, Idaho courts have "repeatedly found a
boundary by agreement where a fence is treated as the property line for a number of years, there
is no information about why the fence was built, and no evidence to disprove that the fence was
intended to be a boundary." Flying Elk, 149 Idaho at 14, 232 P.3d at 335. Ultimately, "[t]he
doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence is based on a reasonable assumption implied
from the surrounding circumstances." Luce, 142 Idaho at 272, 127 P.3d at 174.
Here, the District Court properly found that the Old Fence satisfied the elements of
boundary line by agreement. R. at 250. It was undisputed that the Old Fence existed for at least
64 years before the dispute between the Fischers and Crostons arose. R. at 248. Moreover, it is
undisputed that both the parties and their predecessors in interest regarded the Old Fence as the
boundary line between the properties. Appellants' Brief, at p. 10 ("The appellants have no
disagreement that a boundary is established, as in the instant case, after being in place for
numerous years by monument such as a fence.")

These facts, coupled with the evidence

concerning the construction of the Shed on the Fischer Property in reliance upon the location of
the Old Fence line,4 gives rise to the twin presumptions described in Luce and satisfy the
elements of boundary line by agreement.
On appeal, the Crostons do not dispute the facts concerning the Old Fence serving as the
accepted boundary line between their property and the Fischer Property for over six decades.
Appellants' Brief, at p. 10. Furthermore, the Crostons do not assign error to the District Court's
finding that the Old Fence satisfied the elements of boundary by agreement under Idaho law.
4

R. at 85 - 86.
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Accordingly, as a matter oflaw, the Fischer Property absorbed ownership of Tract 1 by operation
of boundary line by agreement since at least 1951. See Stafford, 136 Idaho at 225, 31 P .3d at
247.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that the District Court did not err in its
analysis and application of boundary by agreement in this case. It is important for the Court to
decide this matter first as it controls the context of the only argument raised by the Crostons on
appeal - namely, whether there is a contemporaneous oral agreement between the parties
regarding the boundary line between their respective properties that is legal and enforceable.
Because the Crostons concede that the Fischers owned Tract 1 by merit of boundary line by
agreement prior to the events of September 2015, 5 it is their burden to prove the existence of a
subsequent enforceable oral agreement conveying ownership of Tract 1. However, the Crostons
failed to carry this burden both in front of the District Court and on appeal as discussed below.

D. The District Court Correctly Found That No Legally Binding Oral Agreement
Existed Between the Parties Concerning the Location of the New Fence.
Below and on appeal, the Crostons argue that the parties entered into an agreement fixing
a new boundary line between their respective properties and that this line would be the survey
line marked by Ellsworth. Appellants' Brief, at p. 12. Yet, it is undisputed that no written
agreement exists between the parties concerning the location of the boundary line. R. at 119.
Instead, the Crostons argue that the parties entered into an oral agreement fixing a new boundary
line in September 2015, relying on an unswom statement by the Crostons' son, Jim. Appellants'
Brief, at 12. Specifically, Jim claims that while he was marking the location of the Old Fence,
Mrs. Fischer allegedly said to him:
We will be replacing the fence with a much better fence. We are
going to get a survey to find out where the line is at. We are using
5

Appellants' Brief, at p. 10.
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the same surveyors as the City uses so [there] shouldn't be any
disputes.
R. at 127. Jim states that he "said OK." R. at 127. Based upon this statement, the Crostons
claim that the parties entered into an oral agreement regarding the boundary between their two
properties. Appellants' Brief, at p. 12.
However, this argument is without merit.

The oral agreement described in Jim's

statement, even viewed in a favorable light, does not satisfy the elements of boundary line by
agreement.

Furthermore, the Jim's statement lacks necessary elements to form a binding

contract. Based on these facts, the District Court was correct in findings that no oral agreement
between the parties existed.
1. Jim Could Not Make Any Agreement Regarding the Propertv Boundary.
As described in Section C supra, "[w]here the boundary is uncertain or disputed,
coterminous owners may orally agree upon a boundary line and such an agreement can become

binding on successors if the parties to the oral agreement take possession under it." Flying Elk

Inv., 149 Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added). 6 However, Jim lacked the authority to enter into any agreement on his parents' behalf.

Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904,908, 104 P.3d 946,950 (2004) ("For an agent to bind
a principal to a third party in contract the agent must have actual or apparent authority.").
Specifically, Jim does not have any ownership interest in the Crostons Property. R. at
118. Furthermore, at no time did the Crostons, or Jim himself, represent that Jim was authorized
6 Within its Decision, the District Court embraces the idea that a boundary by agreement can be contemporaneous in
nature -that is to say, applicable to current property owners so long as the true boundary line is unknown. R. at 248
- 249. Below, the Fischers argued that the Statute of Frauds precludes such a contemporaneous agreement, as it
constitutes the transfer of a real property interest which can only be accomplished via deed. R. at 53 - 55. While
the District Court disagreed with the Fischer's statute of frauds argument, it still held that the parties did not enter
into a subsequent oral agreement concerning their mutual property line. R. at 249. The Fischers do not disagree
with the District Court's ultimate finding, but still question whether a boundary line by agreement can be
contemporaneous. Accordingly, this case provides the Court with an opportunity to address this fact ifit so wishes.
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to bind the Crostons in contract. R. at 70. Instead, the Crostons have only asserted that Penning
is their attorney in fact. R. at 131. For these reasons, it was impossible for Jim to enter into an
agreement with the Fischers that directly impacted the Crostons' property rights. See Huyett,
140 Idaho at 909-910, 104 P.3d at 951-952 (affirming that no binding contract between I.S.U.
and a head coach existed because, inter alia, I.S.U. lacked authority to enter into a multi-term
employment contract).
The fact that Penning testified that she was present when the alleged oral agreement does
not remedy the foregoing issue. Specifically, Penning testified that she was "present" when Mrs.
Fischer and Jim allegedly entered into an oral agreement regarding the boundary line. R. at 165.
However, Penning did not testify that she personally spoke with Mrs. Fischer concerning the
terms of the agreement neither did Penning declare that she accepted the alleged agreement on
behalf of the Crostons in her capacity as their attorney in fact. See R. at 165. Rather, all Penning
states she was "present" and nothing more. R. at 165.
Contrary to the Crostons contentions, Penning's presence at the alleged inception of the
oral agreement does not convey power or authority to Jim to enter into a binding contract
concerning the Croston Property. For there to be any possibility of a binding agreement between
the Fischers and the Crostons, Ms. Fischer would have had to of spoken directly with Penning as
the Crostons' named agent. However, there is no evidence in the record that this ever occurred.
Accordingly, Jim's statement is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of an actual
oral agreement between the Fischers and the Crostons, regardless of whether or not Penning was
present.
Again, boundary line by agreement requires an agreement between "coterminous
owners" Flying Elk Inv., 149 Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334.
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Because Jim was neither a

coterminous owner nor vested with authority to enter agreements on behalf of the Crostons, the
District Court was correct in finding that there was "no evidence to support a claim that [the
parties] reached an actual agreement ... regarding a new fence line and boundary." R. at 249.

2. · Jim's Statement Does Not Create a New Boundary Line by Agreement.
Assuming, arguendo, that Penning's presence at the creation of the alleged oral
agreement somehow bestowed Jim with the requisite authority to bind the Crostons in contract,
there is still no evidence in the record of an enforceable contract. The District Court correctly
stated that "the evidence as to [Mrs.] Fischers' alleged agreement is ambiguous at best." R. at
249. This extreme ambiguity prevents any reasonable inference that the parties ever intended to
move the property line.
As described above, Penning only states that she was "present" at the conversation that
occurred between Jim and Mrs. Fischer. R. at 165. She provides a conclusory description of
what occurred, claiming that "the new fence would be placed on the new survey line." R. at 165.
However, this conclusory "scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. For a substantive description of Mrs. Fischer's conversation with Jim, the only
evidence relied upon by the Crostons is Jim's statement.
Analyzing his statement, Jim explained that he was "marking and measuring where the

original fence had been."

R. at 127 (emphasis added).

approached and asked him what he was doing.

While doing that, Mrs. Fischer

R. at 127.

Jim explained that he "was

determining where the fence line used to be," which is to say he was determining where the Old
Fence had been located.

R. at 127 (emphasis added); see also R. at 71, 79 (showing a

photograph of the spray-painted line Jim drew to trace the line of the Old Fence). In response,
Jim stated that Mrs. Fischer said that the Fischers intended to replace the Old Fence and that the
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Fischers were "going to get a survey to find out where the line is at." R. at 127 (emphasis
added). Given the course of the conversation described by Jim, the only "line" that Mrs. Fischer
could be referring to is the line of the Old Fence, which Jim was in the process of marking and
discussing with Mrs. Fischer. See R. at 127. There is no reasonable inference from Jim's
statement that Mrs. Fischer was referring to some new boundary line, unrelated to the Old Fence.
Because the only evidence submitted by the Crostons fails to raise a genuine issue of material
fact regarding the existence of an oral agreement to change the boundary line between the
Fischer Property and the Croston Property, the District Court must be affirmed.
3. The Alleged Oral Agreement Lacks the Requisite Elements ofa Binding Contract.
Assuming again, for the sake of argument, that Jim was somehow authorized to contract
on the Crostons' behalf, Jim's statement still lacks the necessary elements of a legal contract.
Specifically, Jim's statement does not contain definite terms, describe the property involved, or
evidence that there was mutual assent between the parties. Lacking these elements, there can be
no enforceable contract.
For an agreement concerning the sale or transfer of land to be specifically enforced, "the
contract must typically contain the minimum provisions of the parties involved, the subject
matter thereof, the price or consideration, a description of the property, and all the essential terms
of the agreement." Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393,396, 162 P.3d 772, 775 (2007). As stated
above, the only evidence of an agreement between the parties is Jim's unsworn statement. R. at
127.

Moreover, Jim's statement does not provide all of the "minimum provisions" of an

enforceable contract as described by this Court in Chapin. 144 Idaho at 396, 162 P.3d at 775.
Because of this, the Crostons' argument that a valid contract exists between the parties is without
foundation.
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As the District Court correctly stated, "the evidence as to Ann Fischers' alleged
agreement is ambiguous at best." R. at 249. Even when Jim's statement is viewed in the best
light to the Crostons, there is no evidence of an offer-and-acceptance resulting in a meeting of
the minds. Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875, 878, 303 P.3d 234, 237 (2013)
("A meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to contract which takes the
form of an offer and acceptance"). Nor is there any evidence of mutual assent on the terms of
the alleged contract between the parties. Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana Pac.
Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 237, 31 P.3d 921, 925 (2001). Finally, nothing within Jim's statement

provides an adequate description of the property being agreed upon. Chapin, 144 Idaho at 396,
162 P.2d at 775.
Jim's statement merely reflects that the Fischers were planning on replacing the Old
Fence on the original line through the assistance of a surveyor. R. at 127. There is no evidence
that the Fischers made an offer or otherwise sought approval from Jim on this matter.
Accordingly, there is no offer-and-acceptance or mutual assent. ·rndeed, the fact that the Fischers
sent the Crostons a demand letter concerning Tract 1 prior to the construction of the New Fence
belies that there was any meeting of the minds between the parties sufficient to create an
enforceable contract. R. at 11.
For the same reasons given above, there is no evidence of consideration. McColmTraska v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 501, 65 P.3d 519, 523 (2003) ("When consideration

supports a distinct and common understanding of the parties, the understanding becomes an
enforceable contract"). The District Court was correct in its Decision when it stated as follows:
[T]o the extent the Fischers made comments to the effect that they
had unilaterally intended to move the fence line further onto their
property, there would be no enforceable agreement to that effect
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since there was no consideration given by the Crostons. Idaho Jury
Instruction No. 6.04.l provides as follows:
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something
of value was given or was agreed to be given in exchange
for it. In law, the giving of value or agreement to give
value is called "consideration." Consideration is the
benefit given or agreed to be given by one party in
exchange for the other party's performance or promise to
perform.
There is nothing in the record to suggest the Crostons gave up
anything of value in exchange for the alleged decision of the
Fischer to move the fence line northward thereby giving the
Crostons more property.
R. at 250.
Because the alleged oral agreement in the record lacks the "minimum provisions"
required for a contract regarding the transference of real property, -no valid/enforceable
agreement could exist between the Fischers and the Crostons. See Chapin, 144 Idaho at 396, 162
P.2d at 775.
4. The Crostons' Argument That Their Construction ofthe New Fence Constitutes Valid
Consideration Is Contradicted by Their Counterclaim.

Within Appellants' Brief, the Crostons argue that the District Court erred in finding that
there was no evidence of consideration within the record to support the existence of an oral
agreement between the parties concerning their mutual boundary line. Appellants' Brief, at p. 12
- 13. Specifically, the Crostons claim that, because they '"supplied all of the materials and work
for the new fence," they provided adequate consideration for a binding contract. Appellants'
Brief, at p. 12. Right away, this claim fails on the basis that the Crostons provided no evidence
concerning the terms of the oral agreement, a description of the property, or evidence of mutual
acceptance between the parties. While it is undisputed that the Crostons unilaterally constructed
the new fence with their own money, there is no evidence in the record that building this fence
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somehow satisfied their obligations under a contract whose terms are unknown and uncertain.
However, even if the Court focuses solely on the Crostons' contention that their construction of
the New Fence was adequate consideration, this argument falls under the weight of the Crostons'
prior representations in the record.
Specifically, at the District Court, the Crostons alleged within their Counterclaim that the
Fischers owed them one-half of the cost of the New Fence. R. at 24. However, the Crostons
have since pivoted on appeal, arguing that their construction of the New Fence constitutes
adequate consideration for the alleged oral agreement between the parties. Appellants' Brief, at
p. 12. As a result, the Crostons essentially make the following demand - they want the Court to
find that they provided legal consideration to the oral agreement by merit of building the New
Fence while at the same time, request that the Court order that the Fischers pay back at least half
of the consideration that the Crostons supposedly tendered. This argument flies in the face of
any inference that the New Fence was constructed in consideration for an agreement between the
parties. Instead, the better explanation is that, the Crostons saw that they could gain more
property by constructing the New Fence on the recently marked survey line, ignored the Fischers
protestations not to construct the fence, and have since invented the notion that their actions were
solely predicated on a mutual agreement between the parties.
Altogether, the Crostons' argument that they provided valid consideration is "so far
outside the realm of reasonability" that it might warrant Rule 11 sanctions. See Bettwieser v.
New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 330, 297 P.3d 1134, 1147 (2013) (citation omitted)
("We have haled that 'Rule 11 Sanctions are appropriate where an argument on appeal 'was so
far outside the realm of reasonability that it warrants a sanction."'). There is simply no rational
or reasonable explanation as to why the Fischers would enter into a contract with the Crostons
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wherein they would lose a significant portion of their property and have to pay for half of the
cost of the New Fence which deprived them of this property. This fact, coupled with the
numerous instances where the Fischers warned the Crostons not to construct the New Fence 7
eliminates any possibility that there was ever a legally binding agreement between the parties.

5. The District Court Properly Found That the Crostons Committed Trespass Pursuant
to IC. § 6-202.

Below, the Fischers argued that they were entitled to treble damages and their reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this action against the Crostons for waste and trespass
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-202. R. at 60 - 62.

Specifically, the Fischers argued that the

Crostons willfully and intentionally entered upon the Fischers' Property that had "No
Trespassing" signs staked on its boundary, removed the signs, and constructed the New Fence
upon it and that the New Fence constituted a continuing trespass upon the Fischer Property. R.
at 60 - 61. The District Court agreed with the Fischers that the evidence "establishes that the
Crostons, through their agents, crossed the old fence line into the Fischers' property and installed
a fence" and that such actions constituted trespass pursuant to I.C. § 6-202. R. at 251.
On appeal, the Crostons argue that they could not have committed trespass because
ownership in Tract 1 was "never quieted title in the [Fischers]." Appellants' Brief, at p.14. This
argument is meritless as it ignores both undisputed facts in the record and established case law.
First, it is undisputed that the Fischers posted "No Trespassing" signs along the Old
Fence Line, providing notice to the Crostons and the public of their claim of ownership. R. at
251. Indeed, evidence within the record shows that the Crostons willfully removed these "No
Trespassing" signs when they constructed the new fence. R. at 147 - 148.

As such, the

Crostons committed trespass under LC. § 6-202 which states that "[a]ny person who, without

7

R. at 11, 131 -132, 138.
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permission of the owner ... willfully and intentionally enters upon the real property of another
person which property is posted with "No Trespassing" signs .. .is liable to the owner of such
land ... for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed therefor or fifty dollars ($50.00),
plus a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be taxes as costs, in any civil action brought to
enforce the terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails."
Second, the fact that ownership of Tract 1 had not been formally quieted in the Fischers'
favor is immaterial to their trespass claims against the Crostons. As stated above, Tract 1 was
absorbed by the Fischer Property long before the dispute between the parties arose. See Stafford,
136 Idaho, at 225, 31 P.3d at 247 ("[i]f a boundary by agreement is established, the parties to the
agreement are no longer entitled to the amount of property provided for in their deeds and must
ab~orb the effect of any increase or decrease in the amount of their property as a result of the
new boundary."). A quiet title action is not needed for this automatic absorption to occur.
Therefore, as a matter of law; the Fischers owned Tract 1 exclusively and posted "No
Trespassing" signs along its southern border to reinforce their ownership. Accordingly, when
the Crostons willfully and intentionally entered into the Fischer Property and constructed the
New Fence, the District Court properly concluded that the Crostons committed trespass under

E. The District Court Properly Awarded the Attorney's Fees to the Fischers under I.C.
§ 6-202.
Because the District Court found that the Crostons conunitted trespass under LC. § 6-202,
it was required to award the Fischers their reasonable attorney's fees. On appeal, the Crostons
do not address this fact, but erroneously argue that the Fischers should not have been awarded
fees under LC. § 12-121. Appellants' Brief, at pp. 14 - 16. However, the District Court
specifically did not award attorney's fees under §12-121, but rather under I.C. § 6-202. R. at
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292-293. For this reason alone, the Crostons' argument on appeal addressing this issue is
foundationless. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the Fischers will demonstrate why the
District Court did not err in awarding them their attorney's fees under LC. §6-202.
Idaho Code § 6-202 states that any person who commits trespass "is liable to the owner
of such land ... for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed therefor or fifty dollars
($50.00), plus a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action
brought to enforce the terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails." In applying this statute, Idaho
case law clearly holds that "in a trespass action ... I.C. § 6-202 mandates that a reasonable
attorney fee be awarded to the prevailing 'plaintiff."' Bubak v. Evans, 111 Idaho 510, 512, 788
P.2d 1333, 1335 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added); see also Akers v. Mortensen, 156 Idaho 27,
36,320 P.3d 418,427 (2014).
Given the foregoing, the District Court properly awarded the Fischers their reasonable
attorney's fees in accordance with LC.§ 6-202. R. at 293. Again, because the Crostons violated
I.C. § 6-202 and because the Fischers were the prevailing party at summary judgment, the
District Court was required to award the Fischers' their attorneys' fees as a matter of law.

Buback, 111 Idaho at 512, 788 P.2d at 1335.

On appeal, the Crostons provide no

counterargument on this issue.

F. The Fischers Are Entitled to Their Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs on
Appeal.

As discussed in Section E, supra, a party that prevails on an action for trespass under I.C.
§ 6-202 shall be granted their reasonable attorney's fees. Bubak, 117 Idaho at 512, 788 P.2d at
1335. If the Court finds that the Fischers prevail on this appeal, LC. § 6-202 also entitles the
Fischers to their reasonable attorney's fees on appeal. Weitz, 148 Idaho at 868, 230 P.3d at 760
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(Having found that LC. § 6--202 applied, the Court granted Respondents their attorney's fees on
appeal).
In addition to attorney's fees under LC. § 6-202, the Fischers are also entitled to their
attorney's fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121. "Idaho Code§ 12-121 permits an award for attorney's
fees to the prevailing party if 'the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended :frivolously." Flying

Elk Investment, LLC, 149 Idaho at 16, 232 P.3d at 337 (citation omitted). "When an appeal
simply disputes the trial court's factual findings, which are supported by substantial although
conflicted evidence, the appeal is considered :frivolous and an award of attorney fees is proper
under I.C. § 12-121." Id. (citation omitted).
This Court in Teton Peaks Investment Co. v. Ohme and Flying Elk Investment, LLC v.

Cornwall upheld summary judgments finding a boundary by agreement on facts that are similar
to this case. 146 Idaho at 397, 195 P.3d at 1210; 149 Idaho at 16, 232 P.3d at 337. Indeed, the
Fischers relied heavily upon this Court's decision in Flying Elk in its motion for summary
judgment below.

R. at 49-52.

However, despite these clear and recent cases addressing

boundary by agreement, the Crostons persisted with their appeal, but failed to provide any legal
reasons as to why the District Court erred. Instead, the Crostons have "simply asked this Court
to second guess the district court" in the same fashion as the respective appellants in Teton Peaks
and Flying Elk. 146 Idaho at 397, 195 P.3d at 1210; 149 Idaho at 16,232 P.3d at 337. As a
result, this Court should find that the Crostons brought their appeal frivolously and should award
the Fischers their reasonable attorney's fees under J.C. § 12-121, as the Court similarly did
against the appellants in Teton Peaks and Flying Elk.

28 • RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

CONCLUSION

The District Court properly found that the Fischers were legally entitled to quiet title to
Tract 1 through operation of boundary line by agreement.

Furthermore, the District Court

properly ruled in favor of the Fischers, dismissing the Crostons' counterclaim that the parties
allegedly entered into an oral agreement fixing a new boundary line between their respective
properties. Although the Crostons challenge the District Court's Decision in general terms, they
provide little to no legal argument or authority as to how the District Court erred in its findings
and conclusions. Instead, the Crostons' appeal is simply a naked disagreement with the District
Court's Decision with no substance.
Based on these facts, the Fischers respectfully request that this Court affirm the District
Court's Decision below. Furthermore, the Fischers respectfully request that this Court award
them their reasonable attorney's fees and costs against the Crostons under I.C. § 12-121.
DATED this

12.._ day of August. 2017August, 20 I 7.

. orrest Fischer
H Iden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
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